Christopher Goodman
October 4, 1997

Do I have free will, or is every action I make predetermined? This question has concerned me for a long while. It has been the topic of many family dinner conversations, a topic of research, and a question in many prayers. I believe that this question concerns many people, since finding an answer has been the source of much literature, thinking, and religion. I have, after much thought, arrived at the conclusion of Soft Determinism - the Principle of Universal Causality, that for everything that exists or happens there is a cause, is true, but this principle is compatible with the Condition of Free Action. By Condition of Free Action I mean that a person is in control of his own actions (is the source of them) and that person, in at least some circumstances, could have chosen to do an action other than the one actually performed.

Determinism itself seems almost obviously to be true. Can one really think of an action that does not have a cause? Or can one think of something that exists that does not come from something else? True, we cannot know the cause of every action, and therefore it might be wrong to rule out the possibility of an action without cause. But, it certainly seems that all things are causally determined - we just might not know the cause. This is the basis of determinist thinkers, from Paul Holbach to A. J. Ayer: for every action there is a cause.

Now we move into the problems of motives. One might argue that if a person does a genuinely altruistic action, then that person is acting without self interest, only wanting to do the action, not wanting to do the action for personal pleasure. This would almost seem to be an example of an existence (the desire) without a reason or cause. But there is still a cause for the wanting, though it may not be obvious. The cause may simply be that a person needed help, so another person able to do so offered help. The need itself for help may be sufficient cause. There may also be sufficient reason for not offering help, or the reason for offering help may be for the pleasure it gives the helper, but in any case, there is a reason.

Holbach argues that choice, in the simple sense, does not produce freedom. A man "tormented with a violent thirst ... perceives a fountain" would naturally and beyond his control desire the water. But, "if... it is announced that the water he so ardently desires is poisoned, he will, notwithstanding his vehement thirst, abstain from drinking it." He has therefore apparently acted own his on free will by making a choice. But, as Holbach accurately points out, one motive has merely become stronger than the other, or, on another level, the motive is still the same - self conservation. The person might still choose to drink the water, but this is merely because he believes that he "shall derive a greater good by drinking the poisoned water than by enduring the torment." (Feinberg 419)

What Holbach seems to be saying is that because there is a reason, motive, or cause, there is no real freedom in the choice of action. But where would one be without motives in choices? This leads us to the idea of chance. Is freedom the equivalent of chance then? I think not, because I question whether or not chance really exists. True, events may appear to be the result of chance, but this goes against the idea of determinism - that things are causally determined. Besides, as Ayer points out, we view someone who seems to act without reason, or by chance, as a lunatic - someone who is not really free because he does not have control over his actions. Therefore, to some it might seem that freedom does not exist. But, it seems to me that freedom merely has something to do with controlling ones actions as well as the ability to make a choice, and the ability to exercise control is through motives or reasons.

Humans are to some extent the products of genetics and their environment. There are elements in our lives that we can and cannot control, though these things are causally determined. For instance, I cannot control who my parents were, so there are aspects of my physical appearance that I cannot control. However, I can decide to dye my hair, lose or gain weight, get a tan, or even change the apparent color of my eyes with special contact lenses. Now, not everyone has control over all of these elements, but there definitely are elements that can be controlled. The same can be said of the mind. I might not be able to control what I start out with as far as a brain - I have what I have. As the seat of the mind in the body, the brain does affect the mind - somebody without a brain is said to be "without a mind," and this is taken quite literally. Or another example would be that of brain damage. If my brain is damaged, it affects my understanding of the world - it affects my mind. However, with varying degrees in different people, I have considerable choice as to what I put in my mind. Yes, I grew up in my family environment, and that was beyond my control. But I chose to come to Oberlin - to change my environment, to change how I "fill my mind." However, just because I have choices does not mean that there are no reasons behind the choices, or reasons behind the decisions I make. Thus the principle of sufficient reason still applies - there are reasons behind these actions, they just might not be obvious at first.

The fact that there are reasons or causes, however, does not mean that I do not have the freedom to choose. I think that possibly the best way to illustrate this comes from a religious example - Adam's decision to eat the forbidden fruit. Adam was made in God's image, which according to many traditions, means that Adam had free will (in this sense meaning freedom of action, not libertarianism). He lived with God and in accordance with God. The only thing forbidden was the fruit of a specific tree. Then, Adam freely and knowingly made a bad decision - against God's wishes he ate the fruit. This example also adds another condition to freedom of action - the ability to classify actions as good or bad, and then still freely choose between them.

So, as Ayer suggests, let us add the following clarifications to the term freedom. I may be said to have acted freely if: 1. I should have acted a certain way if I had chosen it (it would have been the right decision). 2. I could have acted a certain way if I had chose (as opposed to choosing one course of action, but still taking the other, in the way that a kleptomaniac might choose not to steal, but still do it). 3. My actions were voluntary (meaning unconstrained, not without cause). (Feinberg 435) This provides a more than adequate answer to Holbach's argument that choice does not prove freedom, because we make decisions base on motives and previous experience.

Thus the ability to knowingly make a bad decision is proof of the existence of free will. If one did not have free will (in the sense mentioned above), one would simply do what ever one happened to do, and that action would be the "right" action. Or, one would always do the right action, in spite of what one chose, because one would have no choice in the matter. But the ability alone to make a choice does not constitute freedom - it is the ability to choose and follow, without constraint, the right or wrong course of action. Now, Adam could have chosen not to eat the fruit, and if so, I would not have used this example (and neither, I believe, would the Bible). To broaden the idea, if humans had never knowingly made bad decisions, then the argument for freedom of action would be impossible to prove. However, I know that I have knowingly made bad decisions. In doing so, I exercised the negative aspect of freedom. I had reasons for taking either course of action, and I even had a reason for making the bad decision, but I chose. Thus, I have arrived at the conclusion that Soft Determinism - the compatibility of Determinism and Free Action - is true.